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Introduction
The scientific realist claims that the physical sciences provide, or aim to provide, a true de-
scription of the underlying reality behind the manifest world of experience.1 But much of
physical theory is expressed in the language of mathematics, and if any form of scientific
realism is to be grounded in a mathematical science, it is essential that the realist provide
an account of how mathematics is applied to the physical world. Philosophers of applied
mathematics often explicate the use of mathematics in the physical sciences in terms of the
concept of a representation. In the popular “mapping account” of applied mathematics, it is
argued that we use mathematics to represent certain physical structures (Brown, 1999 and
2012; Pincock, 2007 and 2012). The basic idea is that we identify a physical structure in the
world and then map it onto the appropriate mathematical structure within our scientific theo-
ries (Brown, 2012; 6-7, and Pincock, 2012; 27-29). Formally, a representation occurs when
a morphism can be specified between a relational system in the physical world and a mathe-
matical structure. Based on the popularity of the mapping account of applied mathematics,
it worth taking the time to see if this approach can provide a viable foundation for scientific
realism. At first glance, scientific realism and the mapping account appear to be a match
made in heaven. Following the mapping account, the realist would be able to suggest that
mathematics is successfully applied when the relations that hold within a physical system
are correlated with the appropriate mathematical structure.2 However, the mapping account
of applied mathematics has met with wide-ranging criticism (e.g. van Fraassen, 2008; Bat-
terman, 2008; Bueno and Colyvan, 2011; and Berkovitz, 2015). For the realist, the most
pressing concerns with the mapping account pertain to how a physical structure is identified
and represented as a mathematical structure.
The mapping account is appealing to the scientific realist specifically because it is a
variant of the copy theory of representation. In the copy theory of representation, we rep-
1Alternatively, this sentence could be made compatible with the usual concessions to approximate truth.
2Pincock notes that this is the condition for the successful application of mathematics within the mapping
account (Pincock, 2012; 28).
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resent an object (or physical relation) by copying it, or an aspect of it, onto the intended
representation. Such an account would allow the scientific realist to refer to the mathemati-
cal structure of a scientific theory as a copy of the physical structure in the world. However,
any copy theory of representation is subject to Goodman’s (1976) criticism. Goodman notes
that the copy theory of representation is “stopped at the start” by an inability to identify ex-
actly what is being copied by the representation relation (Goodman, 1976; 9). In Goodman’s
view, we do not copy the object or relation itself, but rather how the object or relation is
conceived. When we conceive of an object or relation, we construe or interpret it and “[i]n
representing an object [or relation], we do not copy such a construal or interpretation–we
achieve it” (Goodman, 1976: 9).3 The problem is that the world does not come ‘carved at its
joints’.4 Rather, the joints are constructs of our conceptual systems, i.e. theories.5 Although
Goodman’s general philosophical position is controversial, his point is clear in the case of
theoretical physics, where the “physical structure” that is being represented is not readily
apparent. In fact, the “physical structure” itself has to be constructed out of a mathematical
theory of the world. The constitutive role that mathematics plays in the physical sciences
presents a serious problem for the mapping account of applied mathematics. If mathematics
is applied in the construction of our physical conception of the world, then it has certainly
overstepped the boundaries of the copy theory of representation. Rather, representation be-
comes essential to the very construction of the physical structure that is at the foundation of
our scientific theories.
The same issue can be viewed from another perspective. At the heart of the mapping
account lies a relation that maps a physical structure onto a mathematical structure. This
relation is defined as a morphism, which is a mathematical relation.6 The problem is that a
3The insertion of the phrase “or relation” is supported by Goodman’s footnote on page 5.
4This issue has been recently addressed in the context of the mapping account by Beuno and Colyvan
(2011).
5See, for instance, Cassirer 1923, Duhem 1954, Goodman 1976 and 1978, Putnam 1987, and van Fraassen
2008.
6Alternatively, we could take the representation relation to be a primitive and leave it unanalyzed. There are
important non-reductionist accounts of mathematical representation, for instance Suarez 2010, but a discussion
of these cases would take us too far afield.
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morphism is defined as a structure preserving map, or function, from one domain of mathe-
matical structure to another, and van Fraassen correctly notes that “to define a function we
need to have the domain and range identified first–and the question at issue [is] precisely
how that can be done without presupposing that we already have a physical-mathematical
relation on hand” (van Fraassen, 2008: 120).7 If the definition of a morphism requires that
a mathematical structure be defined on a physical relation, so that it can be representable in
the mapping account, than we are faced with a dilemma: either the mapping account fails
to account for applied mathematics, or the initial mathematization of the world is somehow
already present. Berkovitz (2015) argues that the mapping account implicitly assumes that
physical structure is mathematical, in a neo-Kantian or Pythagorean sense. If we ignore the
problematic Pythagorean option,8 we are once again led into a consideration of how mathe-
matics is initially applied in the construction of our physical conception of the world.
If the scientific realist wants to base a theory of applied mathematics on the popular
mapping account, then they need to clarify how mathematical concepts are brought to bear
on the construction of our physical conception of the world.9 As with any problem of con-
ception, the realist needs to pay attention to where the points of convention lie. When we
formulate certain scientific theories, especially in theoretical physics, mathematics plays an
integral role in both the definition and relation of scientific concepts. The definitional role
of mathematics delimits the domain of study by imposing a mathematical structure on the
world. However, the relational role of mathematics provides the governing structure on this
domain. The relationship between the definitional and relational roles of mathematics in
complicated by the fact that mathematical concepts do not come free of charge. Implicit in
7The word “was” was substituted for “is” to reflect the tense of the discussion.
8If the Pythagorean view is associated with a naturalistic view of mathematics then it is subject to Brown’s
(2012) criticism and any rationalistic Pythagorean view seems to either collapse into the neo-Kantian view, or
rely on an unaccounted for insight that borders on the mystical.
9This concern becomes more pressing when we consider whether or not a mapping-like account of applied
mathematics is essential to any form of scientific realism. In the widely influential semantic account, scientific
theories are thought to present structures or models that can be used to represent physical systems (Ladyman,
1998; 416). Any such account must clarify how mathematical models represent physical structures and it is dif-
ficult to see how the realist can account for the relation between a model and the world without either assuming
that the representation relation is primitive, or presenting a mapping-like account of the representation.
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their definition is a set of constraints that limit the types of physical structures to which they
can be applied. These constraints are a direct result of certain assumptions that concern the
underlying relations between the basic elements of a mathematical theory. Applying a par-
ticular mathematical concept to the physical world then entails that the basic assumptions in
the underlying mathematical structure, such that the concepts may be well-defined, are sat-
isfied by the world. The structural constraints implicit in the mathematical concepts dictate
the type of physical phenomena that the theory can accommodate (Morrison, 2000; 109).10
If we are to untangle the web of issues related to mathematical representation, it is
best to look to scientific practice and consider how a given mathematical theory comes to
be applied. This paper will shed light on the essential conceptual pre-structuring of the
world inherent in the application of mathematics by presenting an analysis of the use of the
differential calculus in physical theory.11 Specifically, this paper will treat the supposedly
simple application of the differential calculus in the modern definition of Newton’s second
law. The application of the differential calculus requires that the world be pre-structured
mathematically. This pre-structuring constrains the form of the world as understood within
Newtonian theory. The constraints are a direct result of the formulation of the mathematical
structure of the differential calculus. Our focus on mathematical constraint will highlight
the dual role that mathematics plays in the definition and relation of physical concepts. The
constraints imposed by the use of the differential calculus fall squarely within the purview
of the definitional role of mathematics and, as such, delimit the applicability of the mapping
account. This focus on the definitional and relational characteristics of applied mathematics
will also showcase the role of convention and draw attention to the viability of any form of
scientific realism that is based on the mapping account.
The body of this paper is comprised of three sections. The first section will develop
the conceptual foundation of the differential calculus and identify the pre-structuring of the
10But here “type” should indicate form rather than kind.
11Note that the use of the term ‘pre-structuring’ should not be taken as a temporal relation but rather a
necessary conceptual pre-structuring in the logical sense.
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world inherent in its application. The second section will present a basic definition of New-
ton’s second law and a discussion of the constraints that the differential calculus imposes on
the structure of the world as conceived within Newtonian physics. This section will con-
clude with a discussion of what we take to be the limits of scientific realism, as conceived
under the umbrella of the mapping account of applied mathematics. Finally, the third sec-
tion will present a case study of a famous thought experiment by John Norton, simply called
‘the dome’. The pre-structuring of the world required by the differential calculus offers a
firm foundation for the mapping account of applied mathematics, but it also precludes cer-
tain physical structures from being understood within the confines of any theory based on
the differential calculus. The modern formulation of Newton’s second law is such a theory.
The dome thought experiment provides a nice example of a hypothetical physical structure
that fails to meet the necessary conditions for the differential calculus to be well-defined.
Therefore, this structure is excluded by the pre-structuring of the world inherent in the ap-
plication of the differential calculus. On the basis of this argument, we suggest that Norton
incorrectly claims that the dome demonstrates the indeterministic nature of Newton’s second
law. Newton’s second law actually cannot be applied in the thought experiment. This case
study was chosen because it demonstrates the inherent danger in assuming that mathematics
can be applied in a world of arbitrary structure.
The Conceptual Foundation of the Differential Calculus
The differential calculus plays an integral role in almost every theory of modern physics. In
the modern formulation of Newtonian physics, it is constitutive of the very definition of mo-
tion. Formally, the differential calculus is applied to characterize the behaviour of a function
in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of a point by providing a linear approximation to a func-
tion in that neighbourhood. But the differential calculus poses an interesting problem for any
form of scientific realism based on mapping account of applied mathematics. The calculus
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cannot be applied to an arbitrary function, but only to functions of a specific form. There-
fore, the calculus can only be applied within a physical conception of the world in which the
world is structured in a particular way. This pre-structuring of the world is not accounted
for in the mapping account of applied mathematics and is a clear example of the mathemat-
ical construction implicit the in application of mathematics in the physical sciences. Our
treatment of the differential calculus will begin with the definition of the concept of a func-
tion, and trace its development through the concepts of approximation, continuity, and the
infinitesimal, culminating in a discussion of the differential and its role in the differential
calculus.12
The conceptual foundation of the differential calculus begins with the notion of a func-
tion. A function is a relation, or map, from one domain of mathematical elements or structure
to another. Functions are applied in the physical sciences to represent, among other things,
entities (e.g. electrons and planets), constraint surfaces (e.g. the top of a table or a space-
time), and dynamical variables (e.g. force, position, and velocity) in the physical world. In
each of these cases, a function serves to define the quantitative structure of the world by pro-
viding a map from some physical property, or structure, to a element, or structure, defined
in Rn, the n-dimensional space of real numbers. But how is a function is applicable to the
world? Is this not the same question that lies at the heart of our discussion of the mapping
account?
Within the conceptual system of a physical theory that is based on the differential cal-
culus, the application of the concept of a function serves to define the initial mathematization
of the world. This application of mathematics is itself a form of representation, but it is a
representation akin to Goodman’s characterization, in which we apply a representation to
construe, classify, and interpret the world. In this sense, the application of the concept of
a function serves to delimit the domain of study. But it is important to note that this initial
12In this section, We follow the development of the differential calculus provided by Loomis and Sternberg
(1980). If the reader is familiar with the detailed formal development of the differential calculus, they may
want to pass quickly through the mathematical parts of this section.
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mathematization is both selective and productive. It is selective in that only those aspects
of the world that are amenable to functional representation will enter into our physical con-
ception of the world, e.g. extension and spatial-temporal location. When we conceive of
the world as representable by functions, we limit our conception to only those aspects of the
world that consistently allow such an interpretation. It is productive in that we fit the physical
world for a “garb of ideas” to obtain an objective mathematical science (Husserl 1970; 54).
The world as conceived through functions, is a quantitative mathematical world.13
We have barely gotten our feet wet, but the scientific realist might already feel slightly
uneasy. If this initial mathematization of the world is a representation, in the sense of an
interpretation, then there need not be any physical correlate to the mathematical structure.
Rather, the mathematics is playing a definitional role that is constitutive of our physical
conception. This issue is complicated by the fact that the definitional role of mathematics
does not conclude with the application of the concept of a function, but rather only begins.
When we discuss functions in the differential calculus, we are usually interested in the
behaviour of a function in the neighbourhood of a given point, but as we have already noted
the differential calculus can only be applied to certain types of functions. In order to begin a
discussion of the differential calculus, the functions we consider must satisfy four conditions:
Condition 1: The function must be defined on at least one open neighbourhood
of the point under consideration; except, maybe, the point itself.14
Condition 2: The space of the function and the space of its domain must possess
a norm (a definition of distance).15
13The scientific realist might protest that what is needed is not an exact quantitative world but only an
approximation of the worlds inherent structure, however, any attempt to make the notion of approximation
precise will have to provide a quantitative measure for the relation and, as such, would require an account of
how this quantitative structure is defined and applied. This issue will be addressed in the next section.
14We allow for the possible exclusion of the point itself because, looking forward, the difference ratio of the
calculus is not defined at the point under consideration.
15The concept of a norm allows us to provide a rigorous definition of distance and this provides us with a
means to characterize an approximation and a coordinate system. In one dimension, it is customary to employ
the absolute value of the difference between the elements, e.g. |x− a|, as the norm, but in multiple dimensions
there are a few norms that work equally well.
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Condition 3: The function must possess a limit in the neighbourhood of the point
under consideration.16
Condition 4: The functions must be continuous.17
These conditions determine the form of the allowable physical structures that a theory based
on the differential calculus can accommodate. These constraints are necessary for the con-
cept of the infinitesimal to be well-defined and consistently applied. They represent the bare
minimum that must be in place for our discussion of the differential calculus to begin.18
In the modern reformulation of the infinitesimal calculus, based on a rigorous foun-
dation, infinitesimals are defined as functions that not only satisfy the previous four condi-
tions, but also tend to zero as the element of their domain tends to zero, e.g. φ(t) → 0 as
t → 0. The difference ratio of the derivative is defined in terms of infinitesimals, f ′(x) is
defined as (f(x + h) − f(x))/t and this is simply the ratio of two infinitesimals (Loomis
and Sternberg, 136). We usually say that the derivative f ′(x) exists and has a value a if
(f(x+h)−f(x))/t−a approaches 0 as t→ 0, or equivalently if ((f(x+h)−f(x))−at)/t ap-
proaches 0 as t→ 0 (Loomis and Sternberg, 136). In this case, φ(t) = (f(x+h)−f(x))−at
“is an infinitesimal that approaches 0 faster than t (i.e., φ(t)/t→ 0 as t→ 0)” (Loomis and
Sternberg, 136). The fact that “φt converges to 0 faster than t as t → 0 is exactly equiv-
alent to the fact that the difference quotient of f converges to a” (Loomis and Sternberg,
137).19 Therefore, the study of the derivative is equivalent to the study of the behaviour of
16In the ,δ-definition of a limit, we say that a function f(x) tends to a limit l as the element x approaches a
if for every positive  there exists a positive δ such that 0 < |x − a| < δ → |f(x) − l| < . It is important to
note here that only functions possess a limit. Later on, when we discuss the differential calculus, keep in mind
that the relation (f(x+ h)− f(x))/t expresses the ratio of two functions; we consider t to be a function not a
variable.
17A function is ‘continuous at a given point’ if the limit, as defined above, exists at that point and the limiting
value of the function, taken from the left and the right, is the same as the value of the function at that point. A
function is ‘continuous’ if it is continuous at all points of its domain. more intuitive way to talk about continuity
is through Hausdorff continuity. We say a set of elements is Hausdorff continuous if every pair of elements can
be separated by an open neighbourhood.
18One could easily reformulate the following discussion in terms of continuity conditions, but we will base
our treatment of the calculus on a discussion of infinitesimals, due to their intuitive appeal.
19Note: two commas were removed from the quote to fit the quote into the sentence structure.
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infinitesimals.
Following Loomis and Sternberg, we may identify two special classes of infinitesimals:
“big oh”, O, and “little oh”, o (Loomis and Sternberg, 136). A function falls under the class
of “big oh”, f ∈ O, if f is Lipschitz continuous at 0.20 A function falls under the class “little
oh”, f ∈ o, if f(x)/x → 0 as x → 0.21 Clearly, the numerator of the difference ratio of the
derivative, written in the form φ(t) = (f(x + h) − f(x)) − at, must be an infinitesimal of
class “little oh”. If this condition does not hold, the derivative cannot be well-defined.
The notion of an infinitesimal function defines an additional structure within our physi-
cal conception. We require that the functions we define on the world have a certain behaviour
“in the small”. But what type of constraint does this condition impose on the form of the
functions we consider in the differential calculus? To answer this question, we will have to
introduce the mathematical concept of a differential.
In our formal development of the concept of the differential, we will continue to follow
Loomis and Sternberg (1980), and formally base the notion of a differential in terms of a
general coordinate translation.22 The coordinates of a function and its element are usually
represented by an ordered pair containing the point under consideration and the value of the
function at that point, (a, f(a)). We can always move the pair of elements to the origin by a
coordinate translation of the form s = f(x)− f(a) and t = x− a. In what follows, we will
consider an ordered pair (a, f(a)) located near a point at which we would like to study the
behaviour of a function. We can represent a general coordinate translation by the following
diagram.
20a function is Lipschitz continuous if for all x sufficiently close to a, |f(x) − l| ≤ c|x − a|, where l is the
limit of the function and c is a constant.
21From this definition we can show that “big oh” is a subset of “little oh”, o ⊂ O.
22A coordinate translation can represent a passive shift in the coordinate system, or an active translation that
describes the motion of an object.
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Sternberg, 116). The concept of a norm allows us to provide a rigorous definition
of the distance between the elements of a domain and this provides us with a means
to characterize an approximation. In one dimension, it is customary to employ the
absolute value of the difference between the elements, e.g. |x   a|, as the norm,
but in multiple dimensions there are a few norms that work equivalently well. In
what follows we can assume the Euclidean norm: kxk = (Pn1 x2i ) 12 , where n is the
dimension of the space.
Therefore, we need to assume that any function that we consider satisfies all of these assump-
tions before we can define an infinitesimal and the differential.
Infinitesimals are functions that tend to zero as the element of their domain tends to zero, e.g.
 (t)! 0 as t! 0. The difference quotient of the derivative is defined in terms of infinitesimals,
f 0(x) is defined as (f(x + h)   f(x))/t and this is simply the quotient of two infinitesimals.2
The derivative f 0(x) exists and has a value a if (f(x+h)  f(x))/t  a approaches 0 as t! 0.
In this case  (t) = (f(x + h)  f(x)) “is an infinitesimal that approaches 0 faster than t (i.e.,
 (t)/t! 0 as t! 0)” (Loomis and Sternberg, 136). The fact that “ t ... converges to 0 faster
than t as t! 0 ... is exactly equivalent tot he fact that the difference quotient of f converges to
a” (Loomis and Sternberg, 137). The study of derivatives is therefore equivalent to the study of
the behaviour of infinitesimals.
Loomis and Sternberg identify two special classes of infinitesimals: “big oh”, O, and “little
oh”, o (Loomis and Sternberg, 136). A function falls under the class of “big oh”, f 2 O, if
f is Lipschitz continuous at 0 (note: we can always translate the point under consideration to
the point 0 in any space). A function falls under the class “little oh”, f 2 o, if f(x)/x ! 0 as
x! 0. From this definition we can show that “big oh” is a subset of “little oh”, o ⇢ O.
From the concept of the infinitesimal we can now develop the concept of the differential. A
general function is represented by a pair of elements containing the point under consideration
and the value of the function at that point, (a, f(a). We can then translate the pair of elements
to the origin by a translation of the form s = y   f(a) and t = x   a (Loomis and Sternberg,
2Loomis and Sternberg Page 136.
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140). We can represent this translation by the following diagram.
a (1)
a+ t (2)
 fa(t) (3)
t (4)
f(a) (5)
f(a+ t) (6)
tf 0(a) = dfa(t) (7)
dfa(t)  fa(t) = o(t) (8)
5
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Figure 1: Diagram of a Coordinate Tra slation (Loomis and Sternberg, 141)
In the diagram it is clear that the imag of f under the transl ion is given by the relation
∆fa(t) = f(a+ t)−f(a). ∆fa(t) is simply the change in f brought about by the coordinate
translation. The original curve, in the new coordinates, is the graph of ∆fa(t).
We can now define the differential. In the new coordinate system, the equation for the
tangent is given by the functional map l(t) : t → f ′(a)t; where l(t) is the map from t onto
the tangent (Loomis and Sternberg, 141). From this definition of l(t), it is clear that the
existence of the derivative f ′(a) = ∆fa(t)/t as t → 0 is exactly equivalent to saying that
∆fa(t) − l(t)/t → 0 as t → 0 (Loomis and Sternberg, 141). Therefore, for the derivative
to be well-defined in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the point under consideration, the
difference between the map ∆fa(t) and the tangent l(t) in that neighbourhood, given by
∆fa(t)− l(t), must be an infinitesimal of the class “little oh”, ∆fa(t)− l(t) = o (Loomis and
Sternberg, 141). To put the same point another way, we can say that the difference between
∆fa(t) and l(t) must tend to zero faster that t. It can also be shown that the expression
∆fa(t) − l(t) = o is unique (Loomis and Sternberg, 141). The differential is defined as the
“unique linear approximation l(t) ... of f at a and is designated dfa” (Loomis and Sternberg,
141). From this definition, it is clear that without a well-defined differential, a derivative
cannot be defined in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the point under consideration.
The concept of a differential provides a valuable tool for analyzing the behaviour of a
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function near a given point. In the limiting neighbourhood of the origin in the new coordi-
nate system, the difference between an infinitesimal change in the function, ∆fa(t), and the
differential dfa is an infinitesimal of order o. The existence of a derivative at a given point re-
quires that the infinitesimal behaviour of the function, ∆fa(t), can be uniquely approximated
by a differential map, up to an infinitesimal of order o. This means that the existence of the
differential in the neighbourhood of the origin entails that the behaviour of the function in
the neighbourhood can be approximated by a unique tangent. This can be seen clearly in the
following diagram:
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Figure 2: Diagram of a Coordinate Translation and the Differential (Loomis a d Sternberg, 141)
The converse is also true. If the derivative does not exist, then the differential does ot pro-
vide a unique approximation (up to class “little oh”) of the function in the limiting neighbour-
hood of the point (Loomis and Sternberg, 146 -147). Therefore, the existence of a derivative
entails the existence of a unique tangent that approximates the behaviour of the function up
to class “little oh”. Without this internal structure, the derivative cannot be defined. If we
want to apply the differential calculus, then the functions we consider must possess this in-
ternal structure. This imposes a constraint on the form of any physical structure on which
the differential calculus is applied.23
23But, here ‘applied’ should be read in the sense of a scientific realist’s application of mathematics. Of
course, one could apply the differential calculus to discrete systems by smoothing out the discontinuity through
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We are now in a position to characterize the interpretation of the world that must be in
place in order for the differential calculus to be applied. We can see that the functions that we
apply within our scientific conception must be defined on at least one open neighbourhood
of the point under consideration, possess a norm, possess a limit in the neighbourhood of
the point under consideration, and be continuous, they must also possess a specific form
such that the concepts and infinitesimal and differential can be well-defined and consistently
applied. The scientific conception of the world, within any theory that applies the differential
calculus, is defined and interpreted to possess this structure. When we interpret the world
to possess a certain mathematical structure we at the same time construe and classify it.
When we apply mathematical concepts to define the structure of the world, we project a
mathematical structure onto the world in order to make it representable within the mapping
account. And the choice among projectable mathematical concepts imposes a classification,
which is simply a result of the governing mathematical conception that prevails within the
larger theoretical structure.
The selective and productive interpretation of the world outlined in this section is based
on the representation of the world given by the differential calculus, and is not based on any
independent physical consideration. This presents a serious problem for the scientific real-
ist, as the definitional role of mathematics does not necessarily possess a physical correlate.
Rather, this mathematical pre-structuring of the world is a result of our intended representa-
tion the world given by the differential calculus. But this definitional role of mathematics is
only half the story, and we now need to address the interrelation of mathematical concepts
that takes place within a given physical theory.
idealization. But in this case the realist could no longer suggest that the mathematical structure of the differen-
tial calculus in any sense represents the structure of the world.
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Newtonian Physics and the Differential Calculus
Newton’s second law is simple enough to be familiar to almost every high school student and
has remained a common discussion point in the philosophy of science. It expresses a relation
between an impressed force on an object and the resulting change in the objects momentum.
The modern definition of the law asserts that the force on an object is equal to the rate of
change of the objects momentum, expressed as derivative of the momentum with respect to
time. We write this symbolically as F (t) = dp(t)/dt. Within the mapping account, the sci-
entific realist would want to claim that the differential relation maps a physical relation that
holds between the physical force and the physical momentum of an object, which are repre-
sented by two time dependent vector functions F (t) and p(t), into R3, that is, if Newtonian
theory were still accepted as a valid representation of the world.
But this simple narrative is untenable. We have noted that the application of the concept
of a function is itself a representation, but one that serves to define the initial mathematiza-
tion of the world. This mathematical construal, classification, and interpretation provides a
quantitative structure to the world in order to provide a foundation for objective mathemat-
ical science. In this sense the interpretation of the world, as representable in R3, is both a
selective and productive interpretation of the world that constitutes the basis of our physical
conception. The use of functions delimits the conceptual system to only those aspects of the
world that are amenable to functional representation. But what is more important in this case
is the productive aspect of representation that fits the physical world for a “garb of ideas”
to obtain an objective mathematical science (Husserl 1970; 54). For, the application of the
concept of a function serves not only to define a quantitative structure on the world, but also
to define which aspects of the world are to be represented as fundamental variables. New-
ton’s second law produces an objective physical conception by setting a definition of inertial
motion. Physical objects are thought to possess momentum, which remains constant unless a
force acts on the object. Forces are construed to be a non-local relation that all objects enter
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into as a result of their possession of certain properties, e.g. mass.
When we apply these two functions, F (t) and p(t), we do not represent force or mo-
mentum in the sense of a copy theory of representation, but produce a specific mathemat-
ical/physical conception of the world.24 Newton’s second law expresses a relation within
this conception of the world, and if it meaningful at all, then it is a “law” of the world as
representable within R3. But this law cannot be applied to arbitrary momentum and force
functions, due to the constraints implicit in the definition of the differential calculus. Rather,
we need to pre-structure our conception of the world such that the concepts of the differential
calculus can be consistently applied and well-defined.
In order to apply the differential calculus, the function that represents the objects mo-
mentum must satisfy four conditions: namely, it must be defined on at least one open neigh-
bourhood of the point under consideration, possess a norm, possess a limit in the neighbour-
hood of the point under consideration, and be continuous. The first condition is satisfied by
stipulating that momentum, as construed within the Newtonian conception, is specified by
a function that is defined on the neighbourhood of any point on its trajectory. The second
condition is satisfied by imposing a Euclidean metric on R3.25 The third and fourth condi-
tions require that we represent the world in such a way that only continuous functions define
the momentum of any object. Motion, as construed within the Newtonian conception of the
world, is continuous, that is if we wish to apply Newton’s second law.
The application of the differential calculus also requires that the function that represents
the momentum of an object possess a certain internal structure. This structure is necessary
so that the concept of an infinitesimal and differential can be consistently applied and well-
defined. Specifically, what we require is that the functions possess a certain structure “in
the small”. The concept of a differential provides a valuable tool for characterizing the
24This claim is also supported by the existence of equivalent energy-based formalizations of classical me-
chanics.
25The Euclidean metric is defined as: ‖x‖ = (∑3i=1 x2i ) 12 . The absolute time of Newtonian physics is a
one-dimensional space, and the absolute value function, |x|, provides a sufficient definition of distance in that
space.
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behaviour of a function near a given point. The existence of a derivative requires that the
infinitesimal behaviour of the function can be uniquely approximated by a unique tangent.
This in turn requires that the function can be uniquely approximated by a differential map in
the infinitesimal neighbourhood of a given point. Motion, as construed within any conception
of the world based on the differential calculus, is defined to have this internal structure “in
the small”.
However, the pre-structuring does not end here. In the modern formulation of Newto-
nian theory, the momentum function, p(t), is defined in terms of two other functions; one
mass function, m(t), and one velocity function, v(t). Formally, the momentum is defined
as the mass times the velocity, p(t) = m(t)v(t).26 In the case, the differentiability of p(t)
requires that both m(t) and v(t) be differentiable. Therefore, the functions m(t) and v(t)
must also possess the necessary internal structure “in the small”. And finally, the velocity
function is defined as the rate of change of position in time, expressed as derivative of the
position, x(t), with respect to time, v(t) = dx(t)/dt, and the position functions as well must
possess the necessary internal structure “in the small” such that the concepts of the differen-
tial calculus can be consistently applied and well-defined. All of this pre-structuring must be
in place in order to form the Newtonian conception of the world.
So where does this leave the scientific realist? On the one hand, we have a theory that is
supposed to represent a physical relation that holds in the world. On the other, we have a set
of mathematical definitions that construe, classify, and interpret the world in order to apply
the theory. This initial representation of the world imparts it with a mathematical structure,
and this pre-structuring undermines any form of scientific realism based on a copy theory of
representation, such as the mapping account.
The fact is that any mathematical scientific theory that is taken to represent certain phys-
ical features of the world must address the implicit mathematization of the world. Husserl
is right to note that “[m]athematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, or garb
26Against usual convention, the mass functions is defined to be time dependent in order to highlight the fact
that the continuity conditions apply equally to the mass and velocity functions.
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of symbols of the systematic mathematical theories, encompassing everything which, for
scientists and the educated generally, represent the life world, dresses it up as “objectively
actual and true” nature” (Husserl, 1970; 54). Newton’s second law only expresses a relation
in the objective pre-structured world represented in R3. This mathematical law cannot copy,
or map, a physical relation because there is no conception free physical relation that it can
represent, as understood within a copy theory of representation.
Within the mapping account, It appears as though only a contingent form of scientific
realism can be supported. Given a certain mathematical conception of the world, certain
law-like relations hold, but these relations cannot be said to represent any innate structure
in the world. At this point one might wonder if there any viable alternative open to the
scientific realist. The answer will depend on whether or not the scientific realist can make
do without a copy theory of mathematical representation. There is no question of whether
or not Newton’s second law expresses a functional relation, or map, from one domain of
mathematical elements, or structure, to another. The mapping account provides an accurate
description of the structure of the law itself, but this is not really the issue. The real issue
relates to how a given mathematical structure, as a whole, represents a supposedly physical
structure.
The real problem is that any symbolism, mathematical or not, harbours the curse of
mediacy (Cassirer, 1946; 7). What is symbolized or represented is not a copy of what exists.
The scientific realist might respond by abandoning the mapping account and noting that
was is needed is not some exact copy of the world, which may indeed be impossible, but
rather, a rough approximation to its structure. It may be the case that all this supposed pre-
structuring is simply a form of abstraction or idealization that is typical of science in general,
and in this case the real problem is that of abstraction and idealization, not of copying.
The focus on approximation may change the nature of the question, but not its substance.
The idea that mathematics might approximate, rather than copy, a physical structure still
requires a clarification of how mathematics is brought to bear on the world. The concept
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of approximation is equivocal, to say that a certain structure approximates another might
indicate a closeness with respect to a given measure, an indication of similarity, the presence
of common properties, or a number of other possible relations. The problem for the realist
is to make the notion of approximation sufficiently precise without falling back onto the
notion of approximately, or partially, copied structure. However, if the supposed ‘closeness’,
‘similarity’, or ‘common property’ is explicated in mathematical terms, then we end up right
back where we started. The scientific realist needs to find a non-mathematical notion of
approximation that is strong enough to support a viable realism but yet also weak enough to
avoid the concerns associated with a copy theory of representation. Whether or not such an
account can be found, the supposed marriage between the scientific realist and the mapping
account is an unhappy one. Mathematics is not applied to map relations that hold within a
physical system into an appropriate mathematical structure.
Although this paper has largely been a critical discussion of scientific realism and the
mapping account of applied mathematics, it is not without practical importance. The pre-
structuring inherent in the application of the differential calculus precludes certain structures
from being well-defined within the confines of a Newtonian conception of the world. This
pre-structuring limits the types of supposedly physical structures that the theory can accom-
modate. The form of the Newtonian conception of the world dictates the structure of the
physical phenomena that the theory can accommodate, and in the final section, it is worth-
while to take a closer look at the constraints implicit in the application of Newton’s second
law.
The Newtonian Conception of Motion and a Case Study of
Norton’s Dome
What is the Newtonian conception of motion? The first thing we should note is that
since Newton’s second law can only be applied in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of a given
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point, motion can only be defined up to an infinitesimal neighbourhood. If the realist wants
to argue that Newton’s second law is a true description of the phenomena, then it is a fuzzy
description, and this inherent fuzziness is an unavoidable conclusion of the Newtonian con-
ception of the world as governed by the differential calculus.
The description of motion, as defined by a Newtonian conception of the world, is com-
plicated by the possibility of both constrained and unconstrained motion. In the case where
the objects’ motion is unconstrained, the objects’ trajectory is defined solely with reference
to the background space and time. If we consider a point-like object located at a particular
point in space and time, we can discuss its motion with respect to a specified well-behaved
force. At the initial time when the force is specified, the object is accelerated at a rate given
by Newton’s second law. The time evolution of the system can be specified by a unique
trajectory in space and time. Since Newton’s second law is an ordinary differential equation,
and there are no additional constraints on the form of the position function, we can refer to
the existence and uniqueness theorems of ordinary differential calculus in order to demon-
strate that the trajectory of the object is indeed defined and unique (Kaplan,1973; 494-497).
The structure of Newton’s second law uniquely specifies the trajectory of an object with re-
spect to the background space and time, and all of the conditions required for the differential
calculus to be well-defined over every neighbourhood of each point along the trajectory are
automatically satisfied.
The case of constrained motion is more complicated. A constraint imposes certain
conditions on the form of an object’s motion. For instance, we might consider the motion of
an object constrained to the top of a billiards table. In this case, the motion of the object is
constrained to the surface of the table and this imposes conditions on the form of the time
evolution of the system given by Newton’s second law. The problem that arises in the case
of constrained motion is that the form of the constraint may impose undesirable conditions
on the form of the function that defines the object’s position. Since the differential calculus
requires that this function possess a certain internal structure, only certain types of constraints
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will allow for the differential calculus to be well-defined in the neighbourhood of every point.
The good news is that many of the constraints that we consider within Newtonian theory are
constructed to satisfy these conditions. The bad news is that there are many constraints that
impose conditions on the form of a function such that it will possess neighbourhoods on
which Newton’s equation of motion simply cannot be applied. We will now discuss such a
case.
Norton (2003) presents a now famous thought experiment simply called ‘the dome’,
which attempts to demonstrate that Newton’s second law allows for indeterministic solutions.
Norton asks us to consider a point-like ball, of unit mass, located at the top of a frictionless,
perfectly rigid, dome. The shape of the dome is given by h = (2/3g)r
3
2 , where h is the
height of the dome and r is the radial arc length measured along the surface of the dome
(Norton, 2008; 787).27 . The ball is subject only to the force of gravity.28 At the start of this
thought experiment, the ball is located at the apex of the dome.
Figure 3: Norton’s dome with static ball, taken from http://www.pitt.edu/ jdnorton/Goodies/Dome
Norton claims that the gravitational force, F , acting on the ball is given by: F = (dh/dr) =
r
1
2 (Norton, 2008; 787). Since the ball has unit mass, Newton’s second law states that the
acceleration, d
2r
dt2
, is equal to this force, the result gives: d2r/dt2 = r
1
2 . This is the equation
of motion for a ball anywhere on the surface of the dome (Norton, 2008; 787).
We now come to the crux of Norton’s argument. The equation of motion for a ball
located at the apex is given by: d2r/dt2 = 0. One solution to this equation is: r(t) = 0
27From this point onwards the gravitational constant, g, will be set to 1
28Imagine that the dome is located within ahomogeneous gravitational field pointing downwards in the fol-
lowing diagram.
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(Norton, 2008; 788). This is the solution that we naturally accept; that is, the radial co-
ordinate of the ball remains constant. According to this criterion, the ball should not move.
However, Norton claims that there is an alternative solution given by (Norton, 2008; 788):
r(t) =

1
144
(t− T )4 for t ≥ T
0 for t ≤ T.
(1)
This solution states that the ball remains at the apex, for some arbitrary time, where it is
subject to the equation of motion at the apex: d2r/dt2 = 0. However, spontaneously, the ball
may begin to roll and is subsequently subject to the equation of motion for the surface of the
dome: d2r/dt2 = r
1
2 .
This solution states that the ball will remain at rest for some period of time, when
t ≤ T , and at t = T the ball will spontaneously begin to roll down the dome. Notice the
independence of these equations of motion on the radial direction the dome. If the ball is
to move, there is no way of predicting the direction that it will go. Norton’s conclusion is
a result of the fact that the structure of the dome violates the Lipschitz condition and the
associated existence and uniqueness theorem of ordinary differential calculus. It turns out
that there is no way to predict at what time T the ball will begin to roll. If we add this fact to
the independence of the equations of motion on the radial direction of descent, we observe a
true indeterminacy in both the time and direction of descent. This is Norton’s demonstration
of indeterminacy at work in Newtonian physics. The whole situation is summed up nicely in
the following diagram.
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Figure 4: Norton’s dome with falling ball, taken from http://www.pitt.edu/ jdnorton/Goodies/Dome
We intend to show that the problem with Norton’s argument is that the differential cal-
culus actually cannot be applied in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex of the dome.
This can be clearly seen if we consider the case of the ball rolling up the side of the dome to-
wards the apex. We will show that as the ball approaches the infinitesimal neighbourhood of
the apex, the differential structure breaks down. If the differential calculus cannot be defined
in the infinitesimal neighbourhood surrounding the apex of the dome, then Norton cannot
apply Newton’s law in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex, and the argument fails.
To begin, we can define a function, x(s) for the objects’ position on the surface of the
dome in terms of the arch length, s, measured from the apex. We can express the arc length,
s, in terms of the time parameter, t, to define the objects position as a function of time,
x(s(t)). We will express the function x(s(t)) in terms of a coordinate system fixed in the
background Euclidean space. The origin of our coordinates will be centred on the apex of
the dome with the apex itself occupying the point (0, 1).
To simplify the problem, we can consider the case of a ball rolling up the right hand side
of the dome.29 In our coordinate system, the x coordinate of the dome is given by x1(s) =
−2
3
(1−s) 32 + 2
3
, and the y coordinate is given by x2(s) = 1− 23s
3
2 . The right half of the dome
is then given by the equation x(s) = (x1(s), x2(s)). The position of the ball along the dome
as a function of time is then x(s(t)) = (x1(s(t)), x2(s(t))). Newton’s second law states that
29We can define all of the other solutions from the radial symmetry.
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F = mx′′(s(t)), where each prime indicates a derivative with respect to time, t. Expanding
out the derivative by the chain rule, we find that x′′(s(t)) = x¨(s(t))s′(t) + x˙(s(t))s′′(t),
where each dot indicates a derivative with respect to arc length, s. We can immediately note
that x˙(s(t)) is the tangent to the dome and x¨(s(t)) is the normal to the dome. The behaviour
of the derivative x′′(s(t)) in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex is a function of the
tangent and the normal to the dome. Therefore, we can get a good feel for how the ball
will behave in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex by studying the behaviour of the
tangent and normal in that neighbourhood.
In our coordinate system, the tangent and the normal to Norton’s dome are given by:
x˙(s(t)) = (
√
(1− s),−√s) and x¨(s(t)) = (− 1
2
√
1−s ,− 12√s), respectively. Immediately, we
see that we are going to run into a problem. As the ball rolls towards the apex of the dome we
see that the normal to the curve will blow up in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex.
This is simply a result of the fact that the curvature of the dome κ(s) =
√
(x¨(s) · x¨(s)) blows
up in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex. Therefore, the derivative that represents
the objects acceleration blows up as the object heads to the apex; Malament has come to the
same conclusion (Malament, 2008). He suggests that the fact curvature blows up at the apex,
shows that the apex of the dome has a zero fly-off speed, and might be considered to be a
more of launching pad than a constraint surface (Malament, 2008; 13). Norton responded by
noting that we could consider the ball, or in this case a bead, to be constrained to the surface
of the dome by a perfectly rigid wire (Norton, 2008; 790). Norton claims that the wire would
then provide the necessary constraint force to keep the ball on the surface of the dome, and
Malament’s concerns are easily alleviated. This apparent “solution” in no way alleviates
Malament’s concerns. The real problem is that the differential calculus simply cannot be
applied in Norton’s thought experiment.
Drawing from our discussion of the differential calculus, we can see what is going on.
We know that the fact that the normal to the curve blows up in the infinitesimal neighbour-
hood of the apex indicates that the infinitesimal ∆x˙(s(t)) − dx˙(s(t)) = x˙(s(t + h)) −
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x˙(s(t)) − l(s(t)), where l(s(t)) is the tangent to the surface, is not of class “little oh”. The
issue is that ∆x˙(s(t)) does not tend to its limit as fast as h→ 0. Therefore, when we take the
derivative, we find that it blows up because the change in the function, ∆x˙(s(t)), remains
finite as h → 0. If we cannot define an infinitesimal ∆x˙(s(t)) − dx˙(s(t)) of class “little
oh” then we cannot define a differential to the curve in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of
the apex. If we cannot define a differential, then we cannot define a unique tangent, l(s(t)),
to the curve, x˙(s(t)), that approximates the curve up to a class of “little oh”. The problem
is that we simply cannot determine the behaviour of the function x˙(s(t)) in the infinitesi-
mal neighbourhood of the apex, because we cannot employ the concept of a differential to
approximate the behaviour of the curve in that neighbourhood and if you cannot provide a
unique linear approximation to the function x˙(s(t)) in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of
the apex, then you cannot apply the differential calculus.
To get a feel for how pathological Norton’s dome truly is, we can consider the normal
force acting on the ball in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex. The normal force on
the ball over the surface of the dome is given by: F⊥(s) =
√
(1− s)(−√s,−√(1− s));
and its derivative is given by: F˙⊥(s) = (−12(1 − 2s)/(
√
s
√
1− s), 1). Right away, we see
that the derivative blows up in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex. Just as in our
previous discussion, this indicates that we cannot define a differential to the force function
that approximates the behaviour of the function in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of the
apex. Therefore, we simply cannot define a well-behaved force acting on the ball in the
infinitesimal neighbourhood of the apex. Geometrically, this is a result of the fact that the
force swings though a finite angle in an infinitesimal neighbourhood.
The fundamental problem with Norton’s thought experiment is that both of the functions
employed in Newton’s second law behave pathologically in the infinitesimal neighbourhood
of the apex. All of this pathological behaviour is a simple result of applying Newtonian
physics on a surface that is precluded by the pre-structuring of the world inherent in the
Newtonian conception. Motion, as defined within the Newtonian conception of the world,
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takes place within a mathematically pre-structured world that possesses a specific structure
“in the small”. This pre-structuring limits the form of the phenomena that the theory can
describe.
Conclusion
Duhem was right to note that “[t]he role of the scientist is not limited to creating a clear
and precise language in which to express concrete facts; rather, it is the case that the creation
of this language presupposes the creation of a physical theory” (Duhem, 1954; 151). In the
case of mathematics, the application of this language presupposes that our physical concep-
tion of the world has already been pre-structured mathematically. This initial mathematical
pre-structuring of the world is a representation akin to Goodman’s characterization, in which
we apply a representation to construe, classify, and interpret the world. The choice among
projectable mathematical concepts imposes a classification, which is simply a result of the
governing mathematical conception that prevails within the larger theoretical structure. We
saw that this initial mathematization is both selective and productive. It is selective in the
sense that only those aspects of the world that are amenable to functional representation
will enter into our physical conception of the world. And it is productive in the sense that
we fit the physical world for a “garb of ideas” to obtain an objective mathematical science
(Husserl 1970; 54). The world as conceived through mathematics, is a quantitative world.
The real problem is that any symbolism, mathematical or not, harbours the curse of mediacy
(Cassirer, 1946; 7). What is symbolized or represented is not a copy of what exists.
The mapping account of applied mathematics can only serve as a viable foundation for a
contingent form of scientific realism. Given a certain mathematical conception of the world,
certain law-like relations hold, but these relations cannot be said to represent any innate
structure in the world. If a true scientific realism is to be grounded in a mathematical theory
of the world, we must find an alternative to the mapping account of applied mathematics.
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